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Article
Failure of Multiculturalism?

Immigration, Radical Islamism, and Identity Politics
in Europe

Fatos Tarifa and Monica Di Monte*
This paper addresses the issue of how Europe’s ethnic and cultural mix is changing
drastically by the large numbers of culturally diverse, especially Muslim immigrants, as
well as problems that Western European governments face today as they try to deal with
unintended consequences of their liberal policies of multiculturalism. In light of this
discussion, radical Islamism and identity politics are seen as long-term challenges for all
liberal democracies. We argue that extremist voices among the right-wing populist parties
in many Western European countries opposed to immigration and increasingly mobilized
around the issue of Muslim minorities, may spur resentment and political activism among
Muslim immigrant communities, which can turn very violent. We conclude that for the
time being, the best realistic scenario is that Islamic radicalism in Europe will continue on
a lower level of intensity, but it will not disappear and it may aggravate existing tensions
in the future.
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Even before the outbreak of the current refugee crises in Europe, one-third of Germans
believed their country—home to more than four million Muslim immigrants—is “overrun
by foreigners” (The Guardian, 17 October 2010). In May 2005, Frits Bolkestein, a former
European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, summed up his view on the
rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the French and his Dutch nationals by declaring
the much quoted phrase: “Europe has been oversold” (Bolkestein 2005). Others have
blatantly stated that “Europe is full.” Words like these have become endemic in the
consciousness of many Europeans, who see the growing number of—particularly
Muslim—immigrants in their societies as a ruinous trend—an “invasion by the Muslims.”
In her 2004 controversial book, La Forza della Ragione (The Force of Reason), Oriana
Fallaci, the late renowned Italian journalist and novelist, claimed that Europe, like Troy, is
“in flames” and, under a Muslim siege, is becoming “more and more a province of Islam,
a colony of Islam.” The historian Bat Ye’or (2002) dubbed this colony “Eurabia,”
claiming that “the goal of Eurabia is to bring together the two shores of the Mediterranean
with the interests of European society mirroring the interests of the Arab world” (Ye’or
2005). The metaphor of a “Muslim internal colony” in Europe is now ordinarily used in
literature. American political scientist and historian Robert Leiken points out the
following:
In a fit of absentmindedness, during which its academics discoursed on
the obsolescence of the nation-state, Western Europe acquired not a
colonial empire but something of an internal colony, whose numbers are
roughly equivalent to the population of Syria. (2005: 123; see also
Leiken 2012: 261)
Two main factors have contributed to this world-shaking development. First, the
hollowing out of Christianity, since Europe is becoming increasingly a post-Christian
society, one with a weakening connection to its historical tradition and values. In the past
two generations the numbers of believing, observant Christians has drastically decreased.
Birmingham reportedly has now more mosques than churches—the churches are bigger
but much emptier (Laqueur 2005: 70)—and analysts estimate that Britain’s mosques host
more worshippers each week than does the Church of England (Pipes 2004). Second, the
rapid decline of birth rates among native Europeans has gotten to a point that if current
population trends continue and immigration cease (the latter being unlikely), Europe’s
population could decline to 275 million by 2075. Indeed, as political columnist and
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cultural critic, Mark Steyn, has noted in his book America Alone: The End of the World as
We Know It, the indigenous peoples of countries like Germany, Austria, Italy, and Spain
are at the start of a population death spiral—well below or about half the replacement rate
(Steyn 2006: 10). Austrian demographer, Wolfgang Lutz, argues that “negative
momentum has not been experienced on so large a scale in world history” (quoted in
Radford 2003).
A study for the European Parliament has concluded that to sustain its current
workers-to-retirees ratio, Europe will need more than 10 million immigrants a year
(quoted in Walker 2006). Unless indigenous birth rates rise beyond pattern and probability,
only immigration—and the industry and energy that immigrants and their children bring—
can provide the spark to keep European societies vital and growing. If this is so, then one
may agree with Joel Kotkin that “the fate of the West in the 21st century may depend on
how well its nations integrate ambitious people from the rest of the world into its fold”
(Kotkin 2006: 94).
Having said that, fears that an incessantly increasing number of immigrants to
Europe will make its prospects even bleaker are spreading fast. By virtue of geographic
proximity, demographic overdrive, and a crisis-prone environment, “Islam is now the
principal supplier of new Europeans” (Steyn 2006: 15). If one child out of four born in
Germany today is of foreign origin, mostly a Muslim, it will be one in three ten years from
now. About 30%–40% of young people under the age of eighteen in German cities like
Cologne or Duisburg, as well as in large sections of Hamburg and Frankfurt are of foreign
origin. The same is true for Rotterdam and Amsterdam in the Netherlands, for Brussels
and Anderlecht in Belgium, and for Paris and Marseilles in France. In many European
cities the “natives” may become a minority within the lifetime of the generation which
now attends school and university.
This prediction is hardly new. In 1968, the British politician and classical scholar,
Enoch Powell, in his controversially famed “rivers of blood” speech, warned that in
allowing excessive immigration, the United Kingdom was “heaping up its own funeral
pyre” (quoted in Reeves 1983: 108). Is it a speculation, or is it already happening?

HAS MULTICULTURALISM FAILED?
Europe’s ethnic and cultural mix is changing drastically by the presence of millions of
first, second and third generation of Muslim immigrants whose numbers are certainly
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going to increase significantly in the coming years. Encouraged by the liberal policies
toward integration (loosely called “multiculturalism”) that countries like the United
Kingdom, Germany, France, the Netherlands or the Scandinavian countries have promoted
for decades, many of them have so far refused to adopt local values and it is dubious
whether this trend will change any time soon. This situation has urged many European
leaders to harshly criticize multiculturalism, the policy espoused by their governments
since the 1960s. Multiculturalism was based on the principle of the right of all groups to
live by their traditional values, but it has largely failed to promote a sense of common
identity centered on values of human rights, democracy, social integration and equality
before the law. On the contrary, it has encouraged “segregated communities” where
extremist ideology and home-grown Islamic terrorism can thrive and, in recent years,
multiculturalism has become “a proxy for other social and political issues: immigration,
identity, political disenchantment, working-class decline” (Malik 2015).
In a much debated speech at a Munich security conference in February 2011,
which sparked fury from numerous critics among immigrant communities and his political
opponents, British prime minister, David Cameron, declared that “multiculturalism in
Britain has failed to provide a vision of society in which members of all ethnic groups feel
they want to belong” (The Independent, 5 February 2011). He said:
We have failed to provide a vision of society [to young Muslims] to
which they feel they want to belong.... We have even tolerated
segregated communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values.
All this leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless. And the search for
something to belong to and believe in can lead them to extremist
ideology. (ibid.)
According to Cameron and others, the failure of multiculturalism is multilayered:
first, multiculturalism has encouraged exclusion rather than inclusion, by siphoning
minority communities away from the mainstream, and condemning them to live parallel
lives; second, by living parallel lives minorities preserve their ethnic behaviors and values
that run counter to broader society; third, these dispersed communities provide fertile soil
for radicalization. Cameron warned Europe “to wake up to what is happening” and “to get
to the root of the problem” (The New York Times, 5 February 2011).
Similar warnings about the failure of multiculturalism have been stated by
German chancellor Angela Merkel and by former president Nicolas Sarkozy of France. In

Failure of Multiculturalism? 9
October 2010, Merkel admitted that the idea of people from different cultural backgrounds
living happily “side by side” did not work and that Germany’s “attempts to create a
multicultural society have utterly failed” (The Guardian, 17 October 2010). Sarkozy, as
well, joined the European leaders who have condemned multiculturalism as a failed
policy. In February 2011 he explained his view on “failure” by stating that “we have been
too concerned about the identity of the person who was arriving, and not enough about the
identity of the country that was receiving him” (The Telegraph, 11 February 2011). In line
with them, former Spanish prime minister, Jose Maria Aznar, and Australia’s former
prime minister, John Howard, have also said that multicultural policies have not
successfully integrated immigrants in their respective countries (ibid.).
Not everyone agrees with them. Referring to Britain, for instance, Anthony Heath
(2012) implies that “not all ethnic communities behave in ways that run counter to broader
society’s values.” Most prominently, Anthony Giddens, in his book Turbulent and Mighty
Continent: What Future for Europe strongly opposes the idea that multiculturalism has
been a disaster. He argues that “the world has moved on from the early days in which the
notion of multiculturalism was originally framed” to what he calls “interculturalism”
(Giddens 2014: 15). This later concept, in his view, is a better one for grasping “the
context of the age of ‘super-diversity’ in which, as a result of the internet, we now live”
(ibid.).

A TALE OF TWO CONTINENTS
There are authors who believe that the immigration problems in Europe are no different
from those faced by the United States, and that the U.S. experience could serve Europe
well (Walker 2006). This in our view is wishful thinking. The immigration problems of the
past half a century in Europe—as well as those likely to emerge with the current surge of
immigrants from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, North and Sub-Saharan Africa—are very
different, more formidable and more acute than those faced by United States. Michael
Burleigh singles out three reasons that place America in an advantageous position vis-à-vis
Europe. First, “the advantage of distance,” which allows people who come to the United
States to mentally divorce themselves from their “unloved past” in a way that is not true of
an Algerian or Moroccan in Madrid, Manchester, or Marseilles, or for a Pakistani in
London or Oslo. In his view, “the United States’ enormous spaces enable people to recreate themselves” (Burleigh 2006: 162).
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Second, “the absence of a welfare state” in the United States where immigrants
are much more likely to enter the workforce and are better paid than are immigrants in
Europe. In the U.S. Muslim immigrants are largely middle-class professionals whereas in
Europe (arguably except for Great Britain, where Muslim immigrants have, in general,
done rather well economically), most Muslim immigrants remain immovably stuck in the
working class, sub-proletariat or unemployed underclass. This means that Americans
don’t have nasty squabbles about who is getting more than their fair share, an especially
contentious issue among the Europeans who by and large believe that migrants have made
no contribution to their systems. In Denmark, for instance, while immigrants from
developing countries—most of them Muslims from Turkey, Somalia, Pakistan, Lebanon
and Iraq—constituted only 5% of the population in 2002, they received over 40% of all
welfare payments (Pipes and Hedegaard 2002). A German Marshall Fund survey of
immigration attitudes compellingly has found that whereas 23% of Britons believe
immigration is the country’s largest problems, across the Atlantic, in Canada and the
United States, where the number of foreign-born people is considerably higher, the figure
is less than 10% (The Independent, 5 February 2011).
Third, the fact that Americans seem admirably skillful at turning masses of
immigrants into “American patriots” whereas all European countries have failed to turn
their immigrant communities into communities of their own citizens. Immigrants to
America have generally been welcomed and encouraged to become full members of
society—fellow Americans—and they are rewarded for doing so. In Western Europe most
immigrants remain essentially estranged and marginalized. Unlike the United States, in
Europe many immigrants do not try, or even want to fit into their adopted country through
active participation in its economic, social and cultural life beyond the possession of its
passport. They do not identify with their new homeland and will not think of themselves as
Dutch, or British, or German, or Swedish. If asked, they will tell you they do not want to
become British, French, German, or Dutch, but instead they are—and have every intention
to remain—Muslims (or Turks, Nigerians, or whatever) living in Britain, in France, in
Germany or in the Netherlands (see Laqueur 2005). Their acculturation virtually never
takes place. Neither “Britishness,” nor “Frenchness,” nor “Dutch values” become part of
their value system. Muslim immigrants in Europe retain powerful attachments to their
native cultures. Most of them get their news on politics, religion and culture from Turkish
and Arab-language satellite TV channels, especially from Al-Jazeera.
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William McNeill (2007: 9) points out that as far as immigration is concerned “the
main difference between Europe and the United States is that the American melting pot
still functions almost as well as it did when Europeans were being turned into Americans
in the 19th century.” Unlike their U.S. counterparts, who entered an enormous country
built on immigration, most Muslim immigrants in Western Europe started arriving only
after World War II, by crowding into small, culturally homogenous nations. Also,
immigration from Muslim countries in Europe “has not been the result of any considered
policy, still less of popular consent, but of a spontaneous market-driven process,
characterized by client politics and chain migration” (Leiken 2012: 261). Yet the problem
in Europe is not just numbers. Unlike the United States and virtually all of its immigrants
who considered—and still consider—their move to the host country as a permanent
displacement, in Europe, neither the hosts, nor the arrivals envisioned immigrants
integrating into the social ensemble; on the contrary, both groups nursed “illusions of
transience,” and “myths of return” (ibid.).
Furthermore, unlike the United States, where Muslim immigrants are
geographically diffused, ethnically fragmented, and generally well off, in Europe, many of
its immigrants live in societies wholly separate from those of the host countries. Europe’s
Muslims gather in bleak enclaves with their compatriots―Algerians in France, Moroccans
in Spain, Turks in Germany or the Netherlands, and Pakistanis in the United Kingdom or
Norway. This is yet another characteristically European difference from the United States.
Whereas in the U.S. the affluent and the middle class have virtually abandoned the city for
the suburbs (in order to have more space), in France and most of Europe, the well-off have
stayed in the city (wanting to travel less). This has relegated immigrants and other poor to
tedious “suburbs”—such as the banlieues of Paris—which the French call the “suburbs of
Islam,” in the periphery of the cities (see Pipes 1995). Many of them, especially since the
Paris massacre on 13 November 2015, and the latest bombings in Brussels on 22 March
2016, primarily due to the assailants’ many connections to Molenbeek, a heavily Muslim
district of Brussels, are called ZUS (French: Zones Urbanines Sensibles, or Sensitive
Urban Zones). Pipes (2015) calls them “semi-autonomous sectors,” a term which, in his
view, emphasizes their “indistinct and non-geographic nature, thus permitting a more
accurate discussion of what is, arguably, West Europe’s most acute problem.”
Over time, as Muslim immigrants in Europe increase in numbers, they wish less
to mix with the indigenous population in their country of adoption. They have no French
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or Spanish or German or Dutch or British or Norwegian friends and very often they do not
speak their language. Intermarriages are extremely rare. A 2002 survey in Denmark found
that only 5% of young Muslim immigrants would readily marry a Dane (Pipes and
Hedegaard 2002). Girls are usually taken out of school at age fourteen and married off,
and young men are often sent to their home villages of Anatolia or Marrakesh or Pakistan
to find a bride. Once they arrive in Europe, the women are often kept at home, with
virtually no contacts with native Europeans and no opportunities to integrate into the
social fabric of their new country of residence.

WHO’S TO BE BLAMED?
Western European governments may justly be criticized for not having done more to
integrate these new citizens. One wonders, for example, that some Western European
countries have enacted laws that are different for natives than for immigrants. For native
Swedes, for example, the minimum age for marriage is eighteen whereas for immigrants
living in Sweden there is no minimum age requirement (Bawer 2006: 57). In Germany, an
ethnic German who marries someone from outside the European Union and wants to bring
her or him to Germany must answer a long list of questions about the spouse’s birth date,
daily routine, and so forth in order to prove that the marriage is legitimate and not just pro
forma. Such interviews are not required for German residents with Turkish or Pakistani
backgrounds, for instance, since it is normally assumed that their marriages have been
arranged and that the spouses will therefore know little or nothing about each other (ibid.).
Yet, one can almost certainly say that even if West European governments had
done much more to integrate their Muslims immigrants into their societies, integration
would still have largely failed, because it is not wanted and it is resisted by large numbers
of immigrants. Unlike African Americans, or even the blend of nationalities that make up
the American Latino community―the largest ethnic group in the United States undergoing
assimilation―Europe’s Muslim immigrants are to a large degree self-isolated and selfexcluded from European mainstream. Whereas in a relatively accommodating American
society the assimilation process often extends into and beyond the third generation of
immigrant families, as Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan (1970) have shown in their
classic study Beyond the Melting Pot, it should come as no surprise that the adjustment of
Muslim immigrants in Europe, in its context of deep cultural—really, civilizational—
division, reaches into post-migrant generations (see Leiken 2012: 261).
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Walter Laqueur (2005) has persuasively argued that despite the failed policies of
most European governments to accommodate and integrate the Muslim immigrants into
their societies, the social and cultural ghettoization of immigrants in Europe is mostly
voluntary. Immigrant families characteristically carry traditional attachments—tribal
customs, values, and creeds—and in the case of Europe’s Muslim immigration, these have
been robust. It is, therefore, inappropriate to say, as William McNeill’s (2007: 9) does, that
the disaffection and anger of segregated young Muslims in Europe is similar to the gang
culture of defiance among some young blacks in America’s inner cities. Despite the fact—
unmistakably reconfirmed in the past couple of years—that skin color in the United States
still divides, and moral residues from slavery and segregation remain, even as efforts to
bridge the gap continue, African Americans are not hostile to their country or to white
Americans as are many Muslim immigrants to their host societies in Western Europe.
There is no question that African Americans share the same patriotism and love for
America as white Americans. Moreover, racial segregation in the United States has never
been a socioeconomic and political condition chosen by the African Americans
themselves. Historically it has been a condition viciously imposed upon them. In contrast
to this reality, large numbers of Muslim immigrants in Western Europe deliberately chose
isolation and exclusion from the mainstream society they have adopted as their country of
residence, and few reveal close attachment or emotions of French, Dutch, British, or
German patriotism.

IS EUROPE BECOMING “EURABIA”?
There are authors who suggest that the footprint of Muslim immigrants in Europe is
already more visible than that of the Hispanic population in the United States (Leiken
2005; Laqueur 2005) and that the picture will become even bleaker in the next few
decades. A visit to certain quarters of Europe’s major cities offers a glimpse of the shape
of things to come. In East London—which some refer to as “Londonistan,” the title of a
book (2006) by Melanie Phillips—in parts of Birmingham, Rotterdam, Berlin, or
Marseilles, foreign born citizens already constitute the majority. In these areas one finds
the sounds of Cairo (minus the architecture) and the sight and smells of
Karachi and Dacca...Many of the placards and inscriptions are in
languages and alphabets [the visitor] cannot read and the newspaper
corner shops sell predominantly Arab, Turkish, Bengali, and Urdu
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language newspapers. The visitor will pass by many mosques...as well
as Near Eastern and Asian cultural and social centers.... All this is a far
cry from what these quarters used to be like in the 1950s and 1960s.
These were British (or French or German) working-class neighborhoods,
but the locals have moved out. (Laqueur 2005: 70)
It is possible that in one or two generations from now Europe will be much less
similar to the Europe we know today. We would much prefer to be wrong about this.
Unfortunately, we don’t think we are. Even the EU president in the first half of 2005, Jean
Claude Juncker of Luxemburg, had to acknowledge that “Europe no longer makes people
dream” (quoted in Gilbert 2005). We have yet no idea what current and future trends and
events will herald, but it is possible and reasonable to imagine a very undesirable and
unattractive outcome, especially as governments of EU countries seem to have no clear
and common strategy on how to handle the current refugee crisis.
Whereas the hostility toward Muslim immigrants, their segregation and the
challenges they present to social cohesion are not new to most European societies, the
hazards these newcomers could pose to national security did not materialized fully until
the second generation (Leiken 2012). The national security threat emerged in the form of
restive post-migrant groups, like the Hamburg Cell, or the Mullah Boys, a group of
second-generation Pakistanis in the ghettos of Beeston Hill, in Leeds.1
Although the foundations of European societies are being shaken, for the time
being voluntary seclusion in the European big city ghettos is maintained without great
difficulty. However, they are getting so large that soon they will not be just ghettos and the
law of the land may no longer hold. This evident form of ethnic, religious, and cultural
segregation has already created not only pockets with a Muslim majority in various big
cities, but also “cities, villages, or provinces where Islam is dominant” (Ali 2005) and
where bits and pieces of the Sharia have become part and parcel of everyday life among
Muslim communities. In these districts “alcohol and pork are effectively banned,
polygamy and burqas commonplace, police enter only warily and in force, and Muslims
get away with offenses illegal for the rest of population” (Pipes 2015). An example of this
is the town of Evry, south of Paris, where Muslim immigrants constitute two thirds of the
population.
Here, informal islamification has already taken place. Supermarkets
stopped selling pork and alcoholic beverages, and ritual sheep slaughter
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has become an official activity. Social control is extremely high among
Muslims....Although not formally institutionalized...it is the Sharia,
rather than the secular constitution, that enjoys primacy. (Ali 2005: 62)
Today, Muslims (estimated to be no more than 20 million) still make up a
minority in Europe―a little more than 6% of its total population―but that will change
dramatically. And soon. Relying on the latest rate of migration of Muslims to Europe and
assuming their fertility rate will remain unchanged, the Pew Forum has projected that by
2030, Muslims will form about 8% of the European population (Pew Forum 2011). The
majority of them will live in France and Germany, but their number will substantially
increase in other rich EU countries. Guy Millière, a professor of cultural history and legal
philosophy at the Sorbonne, who began to address the issue of the growth and selfsegregation of France’s Muslim population, provides a very grim picture. Economically
speaking,
France is decaying full speed.... The greater part of young people are Muslim, not
integrated with French society, and almost illiterate…. The only things that are
growing in France right now are crime and Islamism. (quoted in Bawer 2006:
173)
Millière predicts that Muslims might in a near future account for more than 20%.
In his view, “France will become a Muslim country” and “French leaders know it,” but
they “will never take a decision that could make young radical Muslims angry,” which is
“one of the reasons why they could not support the United States during the war in Iraq”
(ibid., 174). France is not the only country in Western Europe facing such a discouraging
future. Other European countries fear a similar upshot, which a Danish Muslim leader in
2000 depicted in the following words: “Muslims have a dream of living in an Islamic
society. This dream will surely be fulfilled in Denmark. We will eventually be a majority”
(quoted in Bawer 2006: 33). Indeed, Muslim leaders in Denmark have openly declared
their goal of introducing Islamic law once Muslim population in that country grows large
enough—a not-that-remote prospect. It has been estimated that, if current trends persist,
every third inhabitant of Denmark will be Muslim by 2040 (see Pipes and Hedegaard
2002).
The National Intelligence Council projects that Europe’s Muslim population will
double by 2025 and others believe that by the end of the century Muslims will count for up
to 40% of Europe’s population. Those who are more pessimistic believe that by this
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century’s end, traditionally Christian Europeans will become a minority in Europe, which,
as Princeton scholar, Bernard Lewis, suggested in 2004, will be transformed into a “part of
the Arabic west, the Maghreb” (The Economist, 14–20th October 2006, 29).
A few years ago, Dominique Moïsi of the Institute Française des Relations
Internationales summarized these general trends in Europe today as fears of the Europeans
themselves.
In the case of Europe, there are layers of fear. There is the fear for being
invaded by the poor, primarily from the South―a fear driven by
demography and geography....Europeans also fear being blown up by
radical Islamists or being demographically conquered by them as their
continent becomes a “Eurabia.” After the bombings in Madrid in 2004
and London in 2005...Europeans have started to face the hard reality that
their homelands are not only targets for terrorists but also bases for
them. Then there is the fear of being left behind economically....They
are haunted by the fear that Europe will become a museum...a place for
tourists

and

retirees,

no

longer

a

center

of

creativity and

influence....What unites all these fears is a sense of loss of control over
one’s territory, security, and identity―in short, one’s destiny. (Moïsi
2007: 8–9)
These fears are currently taking alarming proportions in many European countries
as hundreds of thousands of refugees and immigrants from Syria and the broader Middle
East, as well as from Afghanistan and from North and Sub-Saharan Africa, are rushing
towards the richest member states of the European Union—Germany, Austria, France,
Italy, United Kingdom and the Nordic countries in particular. Europe was caught entirely
off-guard by the great number of refugees and immigrants showing up in her borders,
seeking a place where they can live in safety as well as country where that can live a more
dissent life. Moreover, Europe seems to be unprepared—and arguably unwilling—to
resolve some really sensitive political issues regarding migration and identity, and the
future of the European Union itself.
Although for those living Syria and the coast of North Africa the journey to
Europe is costly, uncertain and often tragically fatal—more than six thousand people have
lost their lives in the Mediterranean Sea in the past two years, trying to reach Europe
(Fleming 2015)—many in Europe are scare-mongered by the extreme right and the tabloid
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press about the supposed threats from refugees and immigrants. Although racism,
chauvinism and xenophobia are to be found almost everywhere in Europe, what we see
today in many European political circles is a fear, rarely articulated, of changing
demographics and civic identity. We have seen countries like Hungary and Croatia, the
main gateways to EU from the Western Balkans, tightening their borders with other
European countries to keep refugees from crossing their territory, even en route to other
countries, like Austria or Germany. Their intention is to discourage thousands of refugees
from entering the European Union at all, believing, as in the case of Hungarian Prime
Minister Victor Orban’s, that they are a threat to Europe’s “Christian identity.” In Orban
own words, by closing Hungary’s border he is “defending European Christianity against a
Muslim influx” (see Noack 2015). Considered as the worst refugee crisis since the Great
Lakes exodus in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, more than twenty years ago, and
also a crisis whose scale and severity are unmatched since World War II (Fisher and Taub
2015), the proportions and consequences of the current crises are yet to be seen.
We believe that the current refugee crisis is not a regional one; it is a global crisis.
Although the media coverage has focused intensely on the refugees arriving in Europe—
especially the Syrian refugees—millions of others are fleeing countries as diverse as those
raged by war (Somalia, Afghanistan, and Libya), countries with a lower-lever violence
(Colombia, Honduras, El Salvador, Nigeria and Pakistan), as well as countries were people
suffer sectarian violence and persecution (Eritrea, Maynmar and Bangladesh). Large
numbers of them are seeking permanent settlement in wealthy countries, including the
United States, Canada, and Australia. This trend is likely to endure in the foreseeable
future and will probably become one of the main features of the twenty-first century.

RADICAL ISLAMISM AND IDENTITY POLITICS
Francis Fukuyama has persuasively argued that the most serious long-term challenge
facing liberal democracies today is not “an external one, such as defending themselves
from international terrorism” (2005: 10), but “the internal problem of integrating culturally
diverse populations” and “immigrant minorities, particularly those from Muslim
countries” into “a single cohesive national community…as citizens of pluralistic
democracies” (2006: 6). Culturally diverse immigrants create problems for all countries,
yet according to Fukuyama, “Europe has become—and will continue to be—a critical
breeding ground and battlefront in the struggle between radical Islamism and liberal
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democracy” (ibid.). In his view, this is because radical Islamism—or Islamic
fundamentalism—does not come out of traditional Muslim culture and societies, but it is
rather “a manifestation of modern identity politics, a byproduct of the modernization
process itself.” As such, radical Islamism is something “quintessentially modern.” Shmuel
Eisenstadt and Peter Berger couldn’t agree more. In his book Fundamentalism,
Sectarianism, and Revolution: The Jacobin Dimension of Modernity (1999) and in other
works, Eisenstadt consistently has argued that fundamentalism is not a traditional but a
modern phenomenon. Berger also points out that fundamentalism, understood as “the
attempt to restore or recreate anew a taken-for-granted body of beliefs and values,” is
“intrinsically a modern phenomenon; it is not tradition” (Berger 2006: 12).
The claim that contemporary radical Islamism is a form of identity politics has
been made most persuasively by Olivier Roy in his book Globalized Islam (2004).
According to Roy, the roots of radical Islamism are not cultural, since it is not a byproduct
of something inherent in―or deeply essential to―Islam or the cultural system that this
religion has produced over the past fourteen centuries. He argues that radical Islamism has
emerged because Islam has become deterritorialized in such a way as to throw open the
whole question of Muslim identity (Roy 2004: 2–38).
Roy further argues that the question of identity does not come up at all in
traditional Muslim societies, as it did not in traditional Christian societies. In a traditional
Muslim society, an individual’s identity is not a matter of personal choice; it is determined
by that person’s parents and social environment. Everything—from one’s tribe and kin to
the local imam to the political structure of the state—anchors one’s identity in a particular
branch of Islamic faith. According to Roy, identity becomes problematic when Muslims
leave their traditional Muslim societies―their “natural” community: family, ethnic group
and nation―by, for example, immigrating to Western Europe. Once in a new country,
their identity as Muslims is no longer supported by the outside society, which, on the
contrary, compels Muslim immigrants to conform to the prevailing Western cultural
norms. And because migratory and population flows have greatly increased in recent
decades, more and more Muslims―a third of the World’s Muslims―now live in societies
that are not Muslim, as members of a minority. Under such circumstances, the question of
authenticity arises in a way that it never did in traditional Muslim societies, since there is
now a gap between one’s inner identity as a member of a Muslim cultural community and
one’s behavior vis-à-vis the surrounding Western secularist society. Hence, Islamic neo-
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fundamentalism should be understood as “an agent of acculturation and not a return to a
lost authenticity” (Roy 2004: 19–20). As such, it is “a contemporary phenomenon that
expresses the globalization and westernization of the Muslim world” (ibid., 15).
Farhad Khosrokhavat, an Iranian French sociologist at the École des Hautes
Études en Sciences Sociales, in a 2006 collection of interviews with suspect members of al
Qaeda in French prisons, reports the following interview with an Algerian-born Islamist:
I understood that I was different, that I was not French, that I would
never become French and that I had no business trying to become
French either. I took it well. I was proud of my new Muslim identity.
Not to be French, to be Muslim, just that: Algerian too, but, above all,
Muslim. That was my reconquest of myself, my burst of lucidity, my
awakening. I was rid of the malaise from which I had suffered and all of
a sudden I felt good about myself: no more impossible dreams, no more
desire to become part of this France that did not want me. (Khosrokhavat
2006: 136–37)
Another interview with yet another Islamist Algerian-born inmate in French
prison:
Earlier, France was my model―even if I also resisted this. But my ideal
was to be French, to act like the French: to have my wife, my kids, my
car, my apartment, my house in the country, to become an average
Frenchman and live in peace….But at the same time I had the feeling
that this was more or less impossible: they didn’t want me, even if I had
[French] citizenship and all the rest. They looked down on me, they
treated me like I was nothing and they despised me. This contempt was
killing me…I was tortured by it….Islam was my salvation. I understood
what I was: a Muslim. Someone with dignity, whom the French despised
because they didn’t fear me enough. Thanks to Islam, the West respects
me in a certain way. One is scared of us. We’re treated as fanatics, as
holy madmen, as violent people who do not hesitate to die or to kill. But
one doesn’t despise us anymore. That is the achievement of Islamism.
Now, we are respected. Hated, but respected. (Khosrokhavat 2006: 135–
36)
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An article published in the British magazine Prospect a few years ago, provides a
similar account on a Pakistani immigrant who, having lived in Britain all his life within a
strongly Pakistani household, felt neither British nor Pakistani. In his words:
When I went to Pakistan, I was rejected. And when I came back to
Britain, I never felt like I fitted in to the wider white British community.
And you’ve got to remember that a lot of our parents didn’t want us to
fit into the British community. (Malik 2007)
And since religion—in this case a politically radicalized version of Islam, far
from the traditional “folk” religion of the first generation of Muslim immigrants to
Europe—serves as a natural way of transcending this cultural dislocation, the character in
the story maintains:
Here come the Islamists and they give you an identity....you don’t need
Pakistan or Britain. You can be anywhere in the world and this identity
will stick with you and give you a sense of belonging. (ibid.)2
Understanding radical Islamism as a form of identity, or in terms of “identity
protest” (see Burgat 2003) also explains why second- and third-generation European
Muslims have turned to it. Their radicalization may be considered as “part of a process of
deculturation,” that is, of a crisis of traditional Muslim cultures giving way to
westernization and reconstructed identities. “It is a way of appropriating this process, of
experiencing it in terms of self-affirmation, but also of instrumentalizing it to ‘purify’
Islam” (Roy 2004: 22, 23). In this process,
a second and third generation born of Muslim migrants may recast their
feeling of being excluded by importing a psychological frontier to their
spaces of social exclusion in suburbs or inner cities. Islam is cast as the
‘otherness’ of Europe and this may be recast as an alternative identity of
youngsters in search of a reactive identity. (Roy 2004: 45)
This quest for authenticity or a new identity is usually expressed both against the
culture of origin and the Western culture, yet by referring constantly to traditional or
Western (anti-imperialist) categories. Stuck between two cultures with which they cannot
identify and with this sense of “otherness,” many “rootless” young European Muslims find
a strong appeal in the universalist ideology offered by contemporary jihadism (see
Fukuyama 2007: 28). As Stéphany Giry (2006) argues, disenfranchised groups among
Muslim immigrants might start seeing themselves as marginalized minorities, hence
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breaking away from mainstream European values and endorsing a supranational Muslim
community (umma) as an alternative society, which no longer has anything to do with a
territorial entity. The reality in Europe today is that young Muslims are increasingly
becoming politically mobilized to support causes that have less to do with faith and more
to do with group solidarity—which Khosrokhavat (2006) describes as “an identity based
on vicarious humiliation”—and Robert Leiken, a specialist on immigration and national
security issues, concludes that “in Western countries jihad has grown mainly via Muslim
immigration” (2004: 9).
Fukuyama may be right in his observation that Oliver Roy may have overstated
the case of viewing radical Islamism as a primarily European phenomenon since there are
plenty of other sources for radical ideologies coming out of the Middle East (Fukuyama
2006: 11). Yet, he admits that Roy’s analysis remains valid and important even in Muslim
societies. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan have all exported radical Islamist
ideology and Iraq may do so in the future (ibid.). It is estimated, that over the last two
decades, Saudi Arabia has set aside US$2–3 billion a year to promote Wahhabism in other
countries (Malik 2007). However, it is precisely these societies’ confrontation with
modernity that produces a crisis of identity as well as religious and political radicalization.
Globalization, driven by the Internet and tremendous mobility, has blurred the boundaries
between the developed world and traditional Muslim societies. It is not an accident that so
many of the perpetrators of recent terrorist plots either were European Muslims radicalized
in Europe or came from relatively more privileged sectors of Muslim societies with
opportunities for contact with the West―they were usually well-versed, well-traveled, and
multilingual (Roy 2004; Rosenthal 2006).
If contemporary radical Islamism is understood as a product of identity politics
and hence a modern phenomenon, then two implications follow, which Fukuyama (2006)
has put forward forcefully. First, we have seen this problem before in the extremist politics
of the twentieth century among the young people who became anarchists, Bolsheviks,
fascists, or members of the Bader-Meinhof gang (ibid., 11). As Frits Stern (1974) and
Ernest Gellner (1983) have lucidly demonstrated, modernization and the transition from
Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft (Ferdinand Tönnies) represent an intensely alienating
process that has been confronted by countless individuals in different societies. “It is now
the turn of young Muslims to experience this. Whether or not there is anything specific to
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the Muslim religion that encourages this radicalization remains an open question”
(Fukuyama 2006: 11).
Second, “the problem of jihadist terrorism will not be solved by bringing
modernization and democracy to the Middle East” (ibid., 12). The view that terrorism is
driven primarily by poverty and a lack of democracy neglects the fact that many terrorists
are radicalized in some of the most affluent and stable democratic societies in Europe. As
Fukuyama points out:
It is highly naive to think that radical Islamists hate the West out of
ignorance of what the West is. Modernization and democracy are good
things in their own rights, but in the Muslim world they are likely to
increase rather than dampen the terrorist problem in the short run. (ibid.,
12)
Extremist voices in Europe invoke alienation and segregation, deprivation and
humiliation, not to mention Islamophobia, everything in brief except the real sources of
terrorist violence. Most Western European countries have right-wing populist parties
opposed to immigration and increasingly mobilized around the issue of Muslim minorities.
These include the National Front in France, the anti-immigration British National Party (a
thuggish group with neo-Nazi links), the hard-right Lijst Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands,
the Vlaams Belag (formerly the Vlaams Blok) in Belgium, the People’s parties in
Denmark and Switzerland, and the Freedom Party in Austria. They are gaining strength
across Western Europe and have often spurred resentment and political activism among
Muslim immigrant communities, which is sometimes very violent. Claire Berlinski asserts
that “if immigration rises to ten times the current levels, Europe will explode. If it doesn’t,
Europe will implode” (2006: 134).
Calling for a ban on immigration and an aggressive policy of assimilating Muslim
minorities into Holland’s libertine culture, for example, have resulted in two political
assassinations in that country in the past fifteen years. These were Holland’s first political
assassinations in 400 years. The murder of Theo van Gogh3 by a 26 year-old, dual
Moroccan-Dutch citizen born and raised in Holland, in particular, rocked the Netherlands
and Europe as a whole. As Daniel Pipes (2004b) has noted, one gruesome killing did as
much to arouse the Netherlands as September 11, 2001, did for Americans.
This tragic event was perceived in the Dutch media and the populace as the
“arrival of Jihad in the Netherlands” (Deutsch 2004). It set off a rash of attacks on Muslim
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schools and mosques throughout that country. In response, Muslim radical arsonists
attempted to burn down churches in Rotterdam, Utrecht, and Amersfoort (Carle 2006). In
a country known for legalized hashish and prostitution, where the International Court of
Justice and the International Criminal Court have their homes, and where a generous
welfare system and housing benefits make possible a work-free life, these attacks seem to
have subverted the traditional Dutch culture of tolerance. From one of Europe’s most
tolerant people, who always thought Muslims would constitute another socio-confessional
“pillar” like Protestants, Catholics, or organized Labor, the Dutch went to taking highly
radical steps to curb the spread of militant Islam by demanding that Holland’s lenient
criminal justice system quickly ratifies legislation analogous to the Patriot Act.
Similar events might gravitate toward more extreme forms of nationalism,
xenophobia or “Islamophobia,” racism, and anti-modernism in Europe and across the
world. A volatile mix of European nativism and immigrant dissidence challenges today
what the Danish sociologist Ole Waever calls “societal security,” or the national cohesion
in many European countries.
On the other side of the spectrum, there are people who believe that
contemporary Islamic radicalism is merely a consequence of Afghanistan, Iraq, and the
Israeli-Arab conflict, and that once these conflicts are resolved, or at least defused, this
danger is bond to pass. Proponents of a European Islam―represented most outspokenly by
the Swiss Muslim philosopher Tariq Ramadan, who teaches at Oxford―believe that this
religious-cultural trend promises to act as a bridge between the Western and Muslim
cultures, provided that the taps of fanaticism in Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, from where the
know-nothing imams and the money to pay them comes, will be shut off. In his book To
Be a European Muslim (1999), Ramadan claims that an independent and liberal Islam is
emerging in Europe among young, educated Muslims who, having been profoundly and
positively influenced by modern liberal democracy—with its free press and separation of
church and state—now consider Europe as a “space of responsibility for Muslims.” He
maintains that
the European environment is a space of responsibility for Muslims. This
is exactly the meaning of the notion of “space of testimony” [dar alshahada] that we propose here, a notion that totally reverses
perspectives: whereas Muslims have, for years, been wondering whether
and how they would be accepted, the in-depth study and evaluation of
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the Western environment entrusts them, in light of their Islamic frame of
reference, with a most important mission....Muslims now attain, in the
space of testimony, the meaning of an essential duty and of an exacting
responsibility: to contribute, wherever they are, to promoting good and
equity within and through human brotherhood. Muslims' outlook must
now change from the reality of ‘protection’ alone to that of an authentic
“contribution.” (Ramadan 1999: 150)
However, most scholars agree that it is unlikely that salvation might come from a
new multicultural synthesis—Sayed Qutb and Mawana Mawduli, the spiritual mentors of
radical Islam on one hand, and the European enlightenment (Kant, Voltaire, Rousseau, and
Diderot) on the other; the sharia, Wahhabism, and the orthodox Muslim way of life on one
hand, and the legacy of the European left, European feminism, and European culture on
the other. Unfortunately, such simplistic hopes are unlikely to come true. As long as many
Muslims believe that their religion should define their politics (i.e., it is not the majority
that decides but the will of God), then the chances for a consensus on democracy are
remote. For the Europeans, the main task for the years and decades to come is not to find a
synthesis, which may be forever elusive, but to preserve social peace through government
policies that can functionally integrate increasingly large Muslim communities in their
societies. Here, Amitai Etzioni’s “Message to Europe” is particularly relevant. He writes:
In seeking to integrate the massive waves of immigrants arriving in
Europe from Syria and elsewhere, Europeans tend to favor assimilation,
which entails making immigrants basically like the societies they join.
Integration would be more successful if Europeans would instead follow
the Diversity within Unity approach, which combines assimilation with
tolerance for differences. (Etzioni 2015)
Therefore, for the time being, the best realistic case scenario is that Islamic
radicalism and terrorism in Europe will not disappear, but continue on a lower level of
intensity and may aggravate existing tensions.
NOTES
1.

Both were groups of radical Islamists; members of the first one became key operatives
in the 9/11 attacks in 2011, whereas Beeston and the Mullah Boys will always be
associated with the 7/7 bombing in 2005.
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2. An even more insightful, persuasive, and gripping account is provided by Ed Husain, a
man who “joined radical Islam in Britain, saw inside, and left,” in his acclaimed book
The Islamist (2007).
3. A well-known radical libertarian, a filmmaker, television producer, talk show host,
newspaper columnist who enjoyed the distinction of being a relative of one of
Holland’s most renowned artists, Vincent van Gogh. He was murdered at 8:40 a.m. on
2 November 2004, in his hometown of Amsterdam while bicycling down a busy street
to work. In the course of being shot repeatedly, Van Gogh beseeched his killer,
“Don’t do it. Don’t do it. Have mercy. Have mercy!” Then the killer stabbed his chest
with one knife and slit his throat with another, nearly decapitating van Gogh (Pipes
2004b). The murderer left a five-page note in both Arabic and Dutch attached to Van
Gogh’s body with a knife. In it he threatened jihad against the West in general, (“I
surely know that you, Oh Europe, will be destroyed”), and specifically against five
prominent Dutch political figures.
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